Fixing Australia’s Elections

Executive summary

Australia has one of the world’s shortest election cycles. This comes at a cost to taxpayers, undermines the government’s ability to deliver long-term reform, reduces business productivity and degrades democratic confidence.

This report outlines the benefits of moving Australia’s Federal Government to four-year terms with a fixed election date, including:

• Election cost savings: creating a level democratic playing field and certainty on the election date, reducing election costs by $5 billion.
• Benefits of better policy: increasing the efficiency and quality of decisions, delivering $14–26 billion.
• Private sector confidence: reducing uncertainty and disruption during election periods, saving $62 billion.
• A stronger and fairer democracy: by removing election date speculation and making it easier for people to participate in elections.

There is public support for change:

• Only one in ten Australians prefer the current system of letting the Prime Minister choose the election date in a three-year cycle.
• 61 per cent of Australians support a fixed election date, compared to just 22 per cent preferring the date being set by the Prime Minister.
• 42 per cent of Australians would prefer four-year terms, while only 30 per cent prefer the current three-year term.
• Three in 10 who prefer a three-year term, or have no preference, would switch to four-year terms, if it was paired with a public holiday for the election weekend.

Change is needed to better equip Australia for modern times:

• Inconsistency with other levels of government: All states and territories have moved from three to four-year terms. All except Tasmania have a fixed election date.
• Increased government complexity: Federal Parliament passes 10 times more legislation than it did at Federation.
• Parliamentary congestion: In the three months before an election, bills receive 45 per cent less debate time in the Senate.
• More diverse voting patterns: Increased minor party vote share requires more time to negotiate legislation through parliament.

Recommendations

1. Develop and implement legislation for a fixed election date
2. Engage the public and develop a proposal for a four-year term, including treatment of the Senate
3. Hold a referendum on a fixed term and four-year term

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Australia’s current parliamentary terms

Australia has one of the world’s shortest election cycles

Australia’s House of Representatives has a maximum term of three years. Unlike most democracies, this term is ‘unfixed’. The Prime Minister has discretion to call a general election at any time within that period. This combination is globally unique: Australia is the only country in the world that combines a three-year term with short notice on the election date. Only three of 87 democracies have parliamentary terms of three years or less (see Figure 1).

In practice, this unfixed system creates political uncertainty. Historically Australian Prime Ministers announce the election date with around five weeks’ notice.¹ Reduced notice periods increase governments’ re-election prospects,² but reduce the time available for businesses, the public service, and political candidates to plan.

Significantly, a full three-year term has been reached fewer than ten times since Federation, with the average parliamentary term since 1901 being two years and eight months.^3,4

The combination of a short maximum term and Prime Ministerial discretion to call early elections means Australia’s current system provides limited certainty for political candidates, the public service, and businesses.⁵ Short parliamentary terms leave government with relatively little time to govern and deliver meaningful reform.

The numbers: Of 87 democracies: two-year term, 1; three-year term, 2; four-year term, 46; five-year term, 37; six-year term, 1.

Source: Mandala and 4 Year Terms Australia analysis of V-Dem Institute Dataset, 2026⁶

All states, territories and local governments now have four-year terms

The Federal Government has three-year terms because most colonial parliaments had the same at Federation in 1901. Consistency was opted for to improve coordination between levels of government.

Since then, every state and territory government in Australia has moved to four-year terms. All except Tasmania have also moved to fixed terms. Therefore, the original justification of three-year terms - to align election timetables - no longer holds.

New South Wales’ referendums on fixed and four-year terms

The New South Wales Government moved to fixed, four-year terms through two separate referendums. In 1981, a referendum on four-year terms (with eight years for the upper house) passed with 69 per cent support.

In 1995, a referendum on a fixed term passed with 75 per cent support. The first fixed election date was announced and legislated in 1991, as part of an agreement with three independent members of parliament, which held the balance of power and supported the change.⁷

In both cases, the referendums had multi-partisan support and were held simultaneously with state elections.

Western Australia’s campaign for four-year terms at Federation

Western Australia was the only state with four-year terms at Federation in 1901. The WA delegation argued that the Federal Government should have the same, but was overruled by the other states which sought alignment with their own three-year model.

Concerns with the Federal Government’s three-year term emerged quickly, with a 1927 Royal Commission recommending it extend ‘to at least four years’. A century later, the federal government is the only outlier with three-year terms.

Parliamentary term comparison

Three-year terms and Senate negotiations

Australia’s three-year maximum term means governments operate within a compressed legislative window. This is particularly relevant given Australia’s Senate structure, where senators are directly elected by voters and regularly oppose or seek amendments to government decisions.

Australian governments often require significantly more time to negotiate and pass legislation through the Senate compared to countries with a single chamber (New Zealand, Nordic countries, South Korea), an appointed upper house that rarely blocks the government’s agenda (Canada, Ireland, Malaysia) and/or has constrained power to veto legislation (United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Austria).⁸

The combination of short terms and a powerful Senate means Australian governments must frontload legislative priorities early in the parliamentary term. Major reforms that require extended negotiation or public consultation face timing pressure, as does the implementation phase once laws have passed.

This interaction is further compounded by a growing minor party vote. If trends continue, a single party is unlikely to form a majority in the Senate and potentially more often in the House of Representatives.⁹ This will increase the time required to negotiate new laws in an already compressed legislative window.

Three-year terms and increased complexity of government

Modern governments must navigate significantly expanded parliamentary workloads. The volume of legislation the federal parliament passes per term has grown more than 10 times since Federation; 30 times more when including delegated legislation and legal instruments.¹⁰

This increased workload must fit within a highly constrained schedule, with Australia’s federal parliament sitting for often less than half as many days per term as many comparable Westminster governments including Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland.¹¹

The growing divide between workload and parliamentary sitting days creates significant bottlenecks. Complex, multi-stage bills as well as lower priorities are too often delayed or abandoned.¹² Reforms are rushed closer to polling day, with bills being debated in the Senate for 45 per cent less time in the three months before an election.¹³

Even when the same party is returned to government after an election, bills must be reintroduced and Senate negotiations restarted, resulting in further delays.

New Zealand’s push for four-year terms

In 2025, New Zealand introduced legislation extending its parliamentary term from three to four years, subject to a referendum. The decision followed a recommendation from a 2023 Independent Electoral Review that found a longer term could produce better laws and more effective governments.¹⁴

Critics of the proposed change argue New Zealand lacks many of the institutional safeguards necessary for a longer term.¹⁵ Unlike Australia, it does not have a Senate, codified Constitution or state governments to constrain government power.

The legislation proposed holding a referendum at the same time as the general election, but was ultimately postponed by the government. If it succeeded, Australia would be the world’s only liberal democracy with a three-year term.

Queensland’s successful 2016 referendum on fixed, four-year terms

Queensland held a successful referendum to move to a fixed, four-year term in 2016. Receiving 53 per cent support, the referendum was held on the same day as the 2016 local council elections and was supported by all parties and independents in parliament.¹⁶

Queensland is the only Australian state without an upper house. This simplified the change as there was no requirement to adjust an upper house term length. However, some critics argued it weakened the case for extending Queensland’s term as there is less constraint on government power.¹⁷

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Benefits of moving to fixed, four-year terms

Parliamentary term length is a balance between accountability and performance. Too long and politicians aren’t accountable to voters. Too short and governments are unable to perform effectively.¹⁸ To manage this balance, four-year terms are the most common globally, followed by five years.

While some argue Australia’s three-year model keeps government more accountable,¹⁹ there is generally broad support by policymakers that a four-year term will deliver better performing governments.²⁰ Australia has robust accountability measures which can accommodate a four-year term effectively. These include a democratically elected Senate, a written Constitution, independent courts, state governments and a free press. Votes of no confidence and other constitutional safeguards can also remove governments early when required.

Moving to four-year terms with a fixed election date provides a better balance of performance and accountability, delivering between $81 and $93 billion in benefits over 20 years. These benefits are driven by lower election costs incurred by the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), more ambitious policy making, and greater business investment.

The numbers: Over 20 years: lower direct election costs, $5 billion; policy implementation benefits, $14–26 billion; indirect economic benefits, $62 billion.

Source: Mandala, The value of shifting to four-year parliamentary terms, 2025 and additional Mandala analysis on the value of shifting to fixed parliamentary terms.

Election cost savings

Elections are a costly exercise, and this cost has been growing. The 2025 federal election cost taxpayers more than $674 million, over three times the real cost of the 2001 election.²¹

Reducing the number of elections by shifting from three- to four-year terms will reduce the direct expenditure of elections. It is estimated that this will be worth $4.6 billion over 20 years, including AEC savings worth $1.6 billion, the opportunity cost of voters’ time worth $1.5 billion, and political party costs worth $1.5 billion.

Shifting to fixed elections will create a further cost saving, worth more than $200 million over 20 years. Currently, the AEC must maintain resourcing to plan for a wide range of election dates.²² Fixed terms would give the AEC certainty to plan election logistics well in advance, reducing its costs.

Over 20 years, the direct election cost savings of shifting to fixed four-year terms will amount to $5 billion.

Benefits of better policy

Governments globally are 25 per cent more likely to deliver meaningful reform in a non-election year.²³ Moving from a three-year to a four-year term is estimated to provide between $14 billion and $26 billion in benefits from improved policy making over 20 years. A four-year term would provide more opportunities for beneficial but potentially politically risky reforms that usually only occur in non-election years.

Moving to a four-year term adds a budget cycle focused on reform and fixing government finances, effectively doubling the number of budgets that can focus on long-term structural reform and balancing the ledger. Under the current system of three-year terms, Australian governments typically deliver three budgets per term. The first is typically used to deliver election commitments and the third prioritises handouts to improve re-election chances.²⁴ That leaves only one budget for fiscal repair and structural reform.

Four-year terms can significantly improve coordination between levels of government. Federal and state governments must work closer together than ever before,²⁵ but their electoral cycles are rarely aligned meaning there is insufficient time to develop and implement shared reform. This has contributed to consistently slow progress on Federation reform.²⁶

Private sector confidence

Moving to fixed, four-year terms could realise $62 billion in indirect benefits over 20 years, largely driven by increased business investment (Figure 2).

On average, business investment in election years falls 2.4 per cent, due to economic uncertainty.²⁸ While some investment is recouped post-election, some investment is forgone due to time-sensitive or irreversible decisions.

Big picture: A stronger and fairer democracy

Allowing the Prime Minister to choose the election date undermines democratic fairness. Elections are timed when polling is highest and announced with minimal notice. Even if an election is not called early, the threat alone can destabilise opponents. Globally, incumbents get approximately a 5 per cent bonus on polling day by choosing the election date.²⁹

Uncertainty also deters civic participation. A short and unfixed term makes it less attractive or unviable for many people to run for parliament or volunteer. Voters also cannot plan around a set date, despite Australia being one of the few democracies where voting is compulsory.

Speculation about election timing fills media coverage which provides no meaningful content to inform people’s vote. This crowds out policy debate and erodes public enthusiasm for the democratic process.

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Public opinion on fixing Australia’s Parliament

Australians want four-year terms

While results differ across surveys, the consistent finding is that more Australians prefer four-year terms over the status quo.

• The Australian Election Study is the leading independent study on voter preferences, conducted by ANU and Griffith University. In 2025 it found that 42 per cent of voters prefer four-year parliamentary terms, compared with 30 per cent for three-year terms (28 per cent no preference).³²
• In 2024 Newspoll found 51 per cent supported a fixed, four-year term with 37 per cent opposed.³³

• A 2024 Resolve Strategic poll found 42 per cent support for moving to a fixed four-year term, compared to 23 per cent opposed.³⁴
• In 2025 McKinnon found 43 per cent support a four-year term compared to 28 per cent who oppose it.³⁵ 57 per cent believed a four-year term would help government make decisions for the long term.

The numbers: Four years better, 42 per cent; no preference, 28 per cent; three years better, 30 per cent (Australian Election Study, 2025).

Source: The Australian Election Study, 2025

There is strong public support for fixed terms

Support for a fixed election date is consistently strong, and above that of four-year terms. Research by JWS Research for this report found 61 per cent supported fixed terms, compared to 22 per cent for the status quo.³⁶

The numbers: Fixed date, 61 per cent; Prime Minister chooses the date, 22 per cent; the rest unsure.

The numbers: Three years on a fixed date, 35 per cent; four years on a fixed date, 30 per cent; the current model (three years with the date chosen by the Prime Minister), one in ten.

Source: JWS Research, True Issues Special Release: National election terms, 2026.

When considering both a fixed term and term length simultaneously, the current model is the least popular with only one in ten Australians preferring our current three-year, unfixed model. The most popular models are a fixed three-year term (35 per cent preferred) and a fixed four-year term (30 per cent preferred).

The prospect of a public holiday significantly increases support for a four-year term. Of those who support a three-year term (or have no preference), 31 per cent would prefer a four-year term if it was paired with a long weekend for the election. This lifts support for four-year terms to 59 per cent.

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Pathway to make the change

A fixed election date should be implemented prior to a referendum

Unlike the shift to a four-year term, a fixed election date can be introduced without first requiring a referendum.³⁷ However, this does not fully guard against an early election being called for political benefit.

Unlike a constitutional amendment, a fixed term introduced by legislation alone can be repealed, as has occurred in the UK. Alternatively, it could potentially be overruled by the Prime Minister, which has occurred in Canada (see Appendix C).

Despite these limitations a legislated fixed term should be introduced ahead of a referendum. Even if there is a question of constitutional validity, a legislated fixed date would likely be effective in practice.³⁸ This would deliver an immediate and meaningful increase to the fairness and certainty of Australia’s elections.

Enacting a fixed term would increase the chance of a successful referendum. Referendums are also more likely to succeed when they formalise an existing norm, rather than asking voters to accept major change.³⁹ By demonstrating a fixed term works in practice, a ‘Yes’ vote would be in support of the status quo.

If legislation for a fixed term cannot be passed prior to the next election, a multi-partisan agreement that any election is announced with at least six months’ notice should be considered (see New Zealand case study, page 19). While a Prime Minister could readily overrule this convention, it would come with a political cost that would often outweigh the benefit.

A four year term requires a referendum

The Australian Constitution allows a maximum three-year term for parliament. Unlike a fixed election date, any increase to the three-year term limit can only be achieved via a successful referendum.

Referendums require careful planning and consideration. Any question put to voters requires widespread support, including amongst the public but also throughout Parliament well in advance for any chance of success (see Appendix A for more details).

However, the need for a referendum should not deter important reform. There is overwhelming support for greater political ambition and long-term decision-making.⁴⁰ More Australians want more frequent referendums than those who want fewer.⁴¹

An expert review can determine the right model

Several important design questions must be resolved for both fixed and four-year terms. Most importantly, moving the House of Representatives to four-year terms would mean the Senate’s six-year term no longer coincides with general elections. This leaves three potential options;

1. Hold a full Senate election every four years (preferred model, see Appendix B)
2. Extend Senate terms to eight years and maintain half Senate elections
3. Keep existing six-year Senate terms and have separate Senate-only elections

For fixed terms, the criteria for when early elections can be held must also be carefully designed (Appendix C).

A constitutional commission, convention or other independent review should be established to develop suitable models for the Federal Government. Bringing together key constitutional experts, it would set appropriate guardrails to maximise the benefits of the reforms and avoid unintended consequences. This process can draw on the models proven at the state level, international examples, and previous federal proposals.⁴²

Putting it to the people

Once the details of the reforms are settled, and there is sufficient consensus, the government should hold a referendum on a fixed term and four-year term. These two questions could be held together in one referendum or held separately (referendum strategy is outlined in Appendix A).

Moving to four-year fixed terms would bring Australia into line with global and domestic norms. The benefits would extend to taxpayers, government and business. More broadly, it would strengthen the engagement and confidence in Australia’s democracy.

With broad political backing, clear public education, and a fair proposal, Australia can build the consensus needed to modernise its parliamentary cycle.

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About 4 Year Terms Australia

4 Year Terms Australia is an independent, non-profit advocacy group with a single goal: moving Australia’s federal government to four-year terms with a fixed election date.

Marty Gray
4 Year Terms Australia

Acknowledgements: Madeleine McCure, Saša Vanek, Lee Bing Tan and Amit Singh from Mandala; John Scales, Edward Langley and Tom Cameron from JWS Research; David Lang from Brockwell, and also Michael Rowland and Dan Smolich for generously donating their time and efforts to make this report possible.

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Referendum strategy

Only eight of 45 referendums have been successful, and it has been nearly 50 years since the last successful referendum.⁴³ Combined with a worthy idea, a successful referendum campaign requires several key elements for a chance at success:

Multi-partisan support and public education must be done in advance

Referendums almost only succeed with multi-partisan support.⁴⁴ For a term length change especially, the reform must be presented as improving the performance of government generally, not as benefiting any political party or politicians in general.

Every successful Australian referendum has also been preceded by sustained community engagement and cross-party messaging.⁴⁵ Voters need time to understand what fixed, four-year terms would mean in practice and why the change benefits the public. This should draw on the broad range of supporters that already exist across the political spectrum.

Questions on unrelated topics should not be included in a referendum

The 1988 referendum on four-year terms failed in part because it was bundled with three unrelated questions, all of which were rejected.⁴⁶ Any future referendum should focus solely on four-year terms and/or a fixed election date.

A referendum should be held at the same time as the federal election

A referendum held during a parliamentary term often dominates political discourse. Even if there is multi-partisan support in advance, there is the temptation for the opposition and minor parties to take a different position once the referendum campaign begins. This was the case for the 1988 referendum on four-year terms, where the Coalition initially indicated a willingness to support it, but then campaigned against all four referendum questions.⁴⁷

A referendum held alongside an election can reduce the temptation for multi-partisan support to fall apart for political gain. During a term, opposition and crossbench can use opposition to a referendum as a rare opportunity to gain attention and channel voter discontent. However, during an election campaign, their messaging must narrow to voters’ key concerns.

Parliamentary term length has not been a top election issue for over 120 years and is unlikely to become one in future. There is little political value in focusing on it during an election campaign. Aligning a referendum with an election should provide the highest chance of success as it is presented as an administrative improvement rather than an ideological debate.

New South Wales and Queensland’s successful referendums were held in tandem with state and local elections respectively. Multi-partisanship was sustained and the issues were not prominent points of debate in their respective elections. By contrast, the unsuccessful 1988 federal referendum was held independently of a general election.

Any amendments to the length of parliamentary terms should commence at a subsequent election. This eliminates any advantage to incumbent politicians and reduces opposition due to people disliking the current government.

Fixed terms should be put in place before a referendum on the issue

Uncertainty is the biggest killer of successful referendums. If a fixed term is legislated first, a referendum becomes a vote to keep what is already working, rather than a vote for an untested change. This significantly increases the probability of referendum success.⁴⁸

A referendum asking voters to extend terms to four years without a fixed date is also less likely to succeed and delivers fewer benefits. A fixed term is critical to provide certainty and fairer elections. It is also necessary to allay concerns that a four-year term expands Prime Ministerial power.

Sequencing referendums should be determined by the highest likelihood of success

A referendum on both fixed terms and four-year terms could occur at the same time (as Queensland) or separately (New South Wales). While holding two separate referendums takes significantly longer, it reduces the complexity of each vote. This allows each question to be considered by the public on its individual merits.

The decision to combine or separate these questions should ultimately prioritise the one determined to give the highest likelihood of success.

If referendums are held separately, the fixed term question should be put to voters first. Fixed term holds higher public and institutional support, is less complex administratively and can be introduced prior to a referendum to build support. Even without a four-year term, a fixed term delivers significant standalone benefits worthy of a referendum.

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Adapting the Senate

Moving the House of Representatives to four-year terms would mean the Senate’s six-year term would no longer occur at the same time as general elections. This leaves three potential options:

• A full Senate election every four years: shorten Senate terms to four years and have a full Senate vote at every general election.
• Extend Senate terms to eight years: with a half Senate vote every four years. Half of the Senate would continue to be re-elected every general election.
• Maintain existing six-year Senate terms: Senate elections would often be held independent of general elections.

A four-year Senate term delivers the greatest benefit

The preferred model is to align Senate terms to four years so that House and Senate elections can occur on a single, predictable four-year cycle. This model is expected to deliver the highest improvement in government performance and accountability.

Reducing Senate terms to four years gives all federal politicians the same amount of time to deliver on their mandate before facing re-election. It provides an effective balance between accountability and performance for the government of the day as well as individual senators.

A shorter Senate term can also address concerns around senator defections. Currently senators can leave the party they were elected under and continue as an independent or join another party. This has raised concerns that this does not represent voter intention, with 93–94 per cent of people voting for a party instead of an individual senator (above the line). A four-year term reduces the incentive for senators to defect and the time they can act independently without seeking a new mandate from voters.

Four-year Senate terms would align the terms of state and territory senators. Territory senators currently only serve a three-year term, half that of their state counterparts. Moving to four years would create an equitable system for all jurisdictions.

The main objection to a four-year model is the loss of Senate continuity. The original purpose of the Senate’s staggered, six-year terms was to provide a check on government power. With half the Senate elected under different political conditions, it could provide a counterbalance in the event of major electoral swings and help ensure states’ rights are protected.⁵⁰

The continuity argument made at Federation does not reflect how the Senate operates in practice. Senators have always voted along party lines rather than state lines.⁵¹ The growth of minor-party voting also means party of government is unlikely to also hold a Senate majority, making it a consistently strong check on government power.

Eight-year Senate terms are a worthwhile alternative

If a four-year Senate term is not achievable, an eight-year Senate term is a worthwhile alternative. It enables synchronised federal elections and minimises changes to the current system. The model has proven effective in New South Wales and South Australia, with limited directly attributable differences in policy-making when compared to the four-year models of Western Australia and Victoria.

The main drawback is voter accountability. While a longer Senate term preserves parliamentary continuity, it extends the time senators have before facing re-election. The benefits of the eight-year model are therefore considered lower than a four-year term, but still significantly higher than the status quo.

A longer Senate term is not a major inhibitor to public support. More than two-thirds of supporters of fixed four-year terms would continue to support the proposal if it meant an increase of Senate terms to eight years.⁵²

The numbers: Keep four-year terms, 69 per cent; change to a shorter term, 15 per cent; change to a longer term, 10 per cent; don’t know, 4 per cent; don’t care, 2 per cent.

Source: JWS, True Issues public survey, 2017

Maintaining a six-year Senate term should not be considered

Maintaining six-year terms would mean Senate elections would no longer coincide with general elections for the House of Representatives. Standalone Senate elections would occur at varying points during a government’s term. This defeats the primary purpose of the reform of reducing election inefficiency and should not be pursued.

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Holding early elections under fixed terms

A fixed term should still allow early elections to break deadlocks or remove dysfunctional governments. It should only limit the Prime Minister’s ability to set a date for political advantage. This model is generally referred to as a ‘semi-fixed’ term.

Australia’s mainland states and territories provide a clear template for semi-fixed terms. All have a set date but allow early elections in some circumstances including:

• passage of a no-confidence motion in the Legislative Assembly (lower house)
• refusal to grant supply (i.e. failure to pass the budget/appropriation)
• the Governor exercising reserve powers where no alternative government can be formed

Conditions for early elections must be set carefully. Too broad, and early elections can still be called for political advantage. Too narrow, and parliamentary deadlocks extend unnecessarily. A constitutional convention or independent review of parliament can develop the appropriate conditions for the federal system.

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Supporting figures

Timeline of changes to parliamentary terms

Comparison of Upper House terms and election methods

The numbers: Pages of Acts passed by each Parliament, 1901 to 2019: low and fairly steady until the mid-1970s, then climbing steeply. The report puts the growth at more than 10 times since Federation.

Source: Mandala analysis.

The numbers: Outside the election cycle, 90 minutes; inside the election cycle, 49 minutes: 45 per cent less.

Source: Mandala analysis.

The numbers: Average sitting days per term: Australia 169; New Zealand 239; Ireland 342; Canada 390; United Kingdom 618 (3.7 times Australia).

Source: Mandala analysis.

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